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Self-organization has become a well-established phenomenon in physics. It is
now also propagated as an important phenomenon in psychology. What is the
difference between these two forms of self-organization? One important way
in which these two forms are distinguished is by the additional presence of
some internal guiding force in the psychological case. Kelso in particular
defends such a two-component view on self-organization. I will refer to this
addition to mere physical self-organization as self-steering. This chapter
attempts to conceptualize the idea of self-steering. Kelso’s interpretation of
self-steering as intentional and informational forcing will be criticized. This
interpretation amounts to the invocation of an unexplained intentional force
that falls victim to many of the problems related to regular representation-
based cognitive science. Instead, I argue that the notion of self-steering is
wider and needs to be developed in its own right rather than being forced into
existing intentional or representational molds.
Introduction
Self-organization has become a well-established phenomenon in physics. It is now also
propagated as an important phenomenon in psychology (Haken, 1995; Kelso, 1995, This
volume). What is the difference between these two forms of self-organization? One important
way in which these two forms are distinguished is by the additional presence of some internal
guiding force in the psychological case. Kelso in particular defends such a two-component view
on self-organization (1995, This volume). I will refer to this addition to mere physical self-
organization as self-steering. This chapter attempts to conceptualize the idea of self-steering.
Kelso’s interpretation of self-steering as intentional and informational forcing will be criticized.
This interpretation amounts to the invocation of an unexplained intentional force that falls victim
to many of the problems related to regular representation-based cognitive science (Clark, 1997;
Haselager, Bongers & Van Rooij, This volume; Keijzer, 2001).
Self-steering can be seen as the introduction of a representational domain in theories of
self-organization. However, I will argue that self-organization requires steering factors that
remain tied to a particular organization in which they perform a modulatory function. As a
consequence the steering factors may be like representations, but they have no meaning or
2existence apart from the self-organizing processes that they help to regulate. In this respect there
remains a major difference with traditional representational theories.
The chapter consists of the following sections. The next section will first develop the
two-component view of self-organization in its most basic, that is biological context. The
following section discusses Kelso’s application of the two-component view to psychology. This
section criticizes his intentional interpretation of the steering factor and is also critical of
Jordan’s (This volume) wide interpretation of intentionality. The next section applies a more
basic interpretation of self-steering to the psychological domain. I will argue that this
interpretation maintains a distance from the invocation of regular representations. Also, the need
to understand self-steering in a more concrete empirical sense leads in a natural way to an
appreciation of non-human basic behavior as an important topic for developing a self-organizing
view on psychology.
Self-organization and ‘representational steering’: the two-component view
The notion of self-organization is a familiar one nowadays. For many years, after the second law
of thermodynamics was formulated, it was common sense that the universe was inextricably
moving toward a state of increasing disorder. Then, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, it became
slowly evident that in systems far from thermal equilibrium—that is in systems pumped with
energy—spontaneous order could arise. Even when the universe as a whole becomes
increasingly disordered, there are parts of this same universe that become increasingly ordered.
This insight became widely known after Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers published their
book “Order out of chaos” in 1984, which provided a generally accessible introduction to this
phenomenon. Since then it has become common place that certain kinds of physical, chemical
and biological systems have this self-ordering capacity in which a collection of initially
disordered components become mutually coordinated and come to show patterns as a collective.
It should be stressed at this point that the pattern-formation exhibited by self-organizing
systems is a perfectly general, physical phenomenon. Haken (1987), for example, originally
formulated his account of self-organization in the context of laser-light, while the development
of convection rolls in a fluid heated from below provides one of the standard cases to introduce
the idea of self-organization (Haken, 1995; Kelso, 1995). Self-organization then is a general
phenomenon that is not necessarily related to biological or psychological phenomena. The
patterns generated simply follow general mathematical rules (Stewart, 1998).
The question that immediately follows from this observation is, of course, in what way
does self-organization then bear on psychology? If the psychological domain is to be thought of
in terms of self-organization, how is it then separated from physical phenomena in general?
Intuitively there seems to be a big difference between laser-light and convection rolls on the one
hand, and thought and action on the other. Actually, this question already applies to biology
where the pattern-formation occurring in living systems is often much more complex than what
happens in non-living systems. What then makes the difference between general, physical forms
of self-organization and what occurs in biological and psychological systems?
The general solution to the problem is to add an extra ingredient to the self-organizing
process. This ingredient consists of a factor that ‘steers’ the pattern forming processes into
specific directions. In biology, DNA plausibly performs this role, while in psychology notions
like mental representations and intentions come to mind. Kelso calls this addition that makes
biological and psychological self-organization different from self-organization in general “the
second cornerstone of biological self-organization” (1995, p.137-138), self-organization itself
being the first one. This second cornerstone is most easily introduced for the biological case,
which will be done in the remainder of this section. In the following sections, I will turn to the
3issue how this steering has to be interpreted in psychological systems.
At first sight, invoking DNA as a steering factor in biological systems seems to
contradict the importance of self-organization there. In the general media in particular, DNA is
often staged as a complete set of master instructions that specify the organization of a living
system. The latter is then seen as a direct derivative of the instructions present in the DNA. In
this image, DNA acts as a controlling agent that actively forces an essentially passive and
compliant medium (consisting of intra and extra-cellular processes) into specific patterns.
However, this general view of DNA as the sole origin of biological order is more and more
disbanded in favor of a view that stresses the additional importance of self-organizing processes
in biological systems (Kauffman, 1993; Goodwin, 1994; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1999;
Stewart, 1998). Stewart puts it as follows:
The complexity of an adult organism, such as a tiger, exceeds that of its DNA by
virtually any sensible measure. The wiring diagram for a tiger’s nervous system alone is
more complex, by several orders of magnitude, than the tiger’s entire DNA sequence.
That sequence, complex as it is, versatile as the contingency plans may be does not
contain enough information to specify how to build a tiger’s brain, let alone an entire
tiger. … The missing information is supplied by the mathematical rules (the laws of
physics) that govern the behavior of matter. (1998, p. 13)
Although there is definitely no agreement about the relative importance of the two
components—self-organization and genetic instructions—it is now increasingly clear that both
are essential. Most important for present purposes is the shift in interpretation this brings about
when it comes to the functioning of DNA in biological systems.
The notion of steering takes on a different meaning when it involves a self-organizing
process. Steering is not a matter of forcefully imposing order onto a system where there is no
order to begin with. The system that is being steered is not passive matter waiting to be molded
into shape. On the contrary, the steered medium provides itself the pattern forming process.
Steering is much less direct and rather takes the form of modulating a set of ongoing processes.
When a system is in the position to develop into two different directions at a certain moment,
steering takes the form of giving it a little push into one direction rather than another.
There are two concepts that are important to make this idea of steering a self-organizing
process more concrete: the order parameter and the control parameter. The order parameter
represents the large-scale (macroscopic) order brought about by the interactions between a
number of parts at a smaller (microscopic) scale (Haken, 1987). In turn, the macroscopic order
parameter constrains or “enslaves” the behavior of the microscopic parts. Whether an order
parameter arises or what form it takes depends on the state of the system as described by a set of
parameters. Some of these parameters act as control parameters. That is, by varying these
parameters, the system as a whole can be shifted from a disordered state into an ordered state, or
from one such a macroscopic pattern into another. Going back to the example of convection
rolls above, changing the temperature difference between the bottom and top of the fluid layer is
a way to shift the system from a disordered macroscopic state into one which exhibits large-
scale convection rolls (and back again). This makes the temperature difference a control
parameter for this particular form of self-organization. Manipulating the control parameter offers
a way to manipulate the order parameter.
In the general physical occurrence of self-organization, such as in the example of the
fluid rolls, the presence and the value of the order parameter is a matter of chance as far as the
order producing system is concerned. Whether or not someone puts on the fire beneath a pan
filled with oil is not for the oil to decide. However, the situation is different in biological forms
of self-organization where the genetic factor comes into play. Using the language of order and
control parameters, one can hold that a biological system is capable of manipulating its own
4control parameters, turning them on and off in order to achieve specific macroscopic states that
can be described by low-dimensional order parameters. As Kelso puts it, in biological self-
organization there are “specific parametric influences” at work (Kelso, 1995, p.138).
Genes can then be interpreted as a set of control parameters that are stored inside the
biological system on a long-term basis. Genes provide the specific parametric influences that are
required to modulate self-organizing processes in such a way that they develop into the many
different structures and shapes of living systems. Following Meijer and Bongaardt (1996, see
also Keijzer, 1998, 2001), I will call this form of control parameter internal control parameter,
or ICP for short. The difference between general, physical forms of self-organization and
biological self-organization can then be summarized by saying that biological systems are
capable of manipulating their own control parameters, and in this way the order parameters that
make up the large-scale structure of biological systems.
The link between genes and ICPs brings to the fore another aspect of ICPs before they
can act as the steering factor of biological self-organization. These ICPs must themselves be
steered by other factors. In simple cases, an inactive ICP can be activated by some other external
and essentially arbitrary parameter. For example, Meijer and Bongaardt (1996) use the effect of
cornstarch on the viscosity of soup as an example of an internal control parameter. In this
example the temperature of the soup triggers the internal parametric influence of the cornstarch.
When the soup starts to boil, it becomes viscous. The drawback of this setup for biological self-
organization is that this process is still dependent on an unregulated external force; someone
who wants to make soup and puts in the cornstarch, assuming there is already a fire on beneath
the pan. In biological systems the triggering of genes that could act as ICPs is itself under the
control of the living system. There is a complicated loop-like system of regulatory genes that
turn on and off other regulatory genes as well as structural genes that actually code for proteins.
In addition there is a widespread feedback of metabolic processes or substances that when
present or absent in turn influence the transcription of particular genes and so on. The whole
takes the form of a so-called genetic regulatory network (Kauffman, 1993) consisting of widely
dispersed and reciprocal influences between genes, proteins and metabolic processes. As
Kauffman argues, such networks are themselves to be interpreted as a self-organizing process
that are very robust to change and very flexible in overcoming disturbances. I will refer to the
invocation of such a loop-like regulatory network for turning on and off ICPs as self-steering.
There are two aspects to this way of interpreting biological cases of self-organization
that are particularly important when this interpretation is also applied to psychological systems.
First, it must be stressed that ICPs are a part of the microscopy. Self-organization implies a
distinction between a microscopy and a macroscopy as two different levels of aggregation and
description. The microscopy self-organizes into a macroscopic pattern as described by an order
parameter. ICPs are factors that happen to initiate and maintain particular macroscopic patterns
and in this sense are closely linked to the macroscopy. However, to act as control parameters
ICPs must have an existence prior to and independent from the macroscopic patterns they help
to bring about. Without such independence, new instances of a particular biological form could
never be generated in this way. Normal control parameters remain outside the range of the
microscopy-macroscopy system and are thus by default independent from the macroscopic
order. ICPs however, must be part of this two-level system, and the only place where they can
function as a parameter independent from the macroscopy is within the microscopy.
In addition, these internal control parameters must also maintain a certain independence
from the microscopic processes to which they belong. When ICPs are to act as a switching
device, initiating and stopping specific biological self-organizing processes, they cannot
continuously take part in the ongoing interactions between the microscopic elements. Their
continuous physical presence within the microscopy must not lead to a continuous specific
5parametric influence. This influence has to be a variable, sometimes present sometimes not. An
ICP must in this sense be buffered from the microscopy at large, while its parametric influence
has to be triggered by some other influence.
All of this corresponds in a general way with current knowledge about the operation of
genes in metabolic processes and morphogenesis. DNA, the material embodiment of genes,
situates the genetic factor firmly within the biomolecular operation of living systems. At the
same time DNA remains relatively sheltered from the immediate ongoing biomolecular
processes and influences these processes indirectly by coding for particular proteins that do the
actual work. Also, the specific codings present within the DNA are derived from long-term
evolutionary selection and in this sense are independent from the short-term ongoing,
biomolecular processes.
To summarize, bringing self-organization to bear on biological systems thus involves
thinking in terms of and teasing out complex regulatory networks with their self-organizing
properties. There is ‘plain’ physical self-organization such as in convection rolls. There is the
steering of this self-organization by specific parametric influences in the form of ICPs. Finally,
there is self-steering by a mesh-like system of multiple, parallel and reciprocal influences,
involving regulatory genes, structural genes, gene products, and factors deriving from the large-
scale build up produced by all this activity. So far, it seems that proper conceptual tools that
would allow us to deal efficiently with this complex, mesh-like organization have not yet been
developed (Bell, 1999). Deciphering how such networks succeed in producing and maintaining
large and structurally differentiated biological systems thus looks like a key issue in
understanding biological systems in general and self-steering self-organization in particular.
I want to end this section by turning to a conceptual issue that, I think, tends to obscure
the problems and possible solutions that are at stake when it comes to these genetic regulatory
circuits. This factor consists of the regular use of notions like symbols, representations, and
encodings to describe the functioning of genes. Of course, there is nothing wrong with these
words themselves, but they are often indicators of a particular interpretation of genetic
functioning. In this particular interpretation, genes are seen as symbolical description of the
organism they are helping to bring about. The metaphor here is still that of the genome as a
blueprint for the construction of an organism (Savageau, 1998). Seen through this metaphor, the
genome is interpreted as a symbol system, containing the description of complete organisms and
as a symbol system equivalent to other coding systems like natural languages, logic, formal
mathematics, and programming languages (Pattee, 1995). However, this interpretation brings us
back to the old conceptualization of an intelligent force set apart from the universe at large that
infuses a mere material system with its order. The idea of an immaterial vitalistic life force may
have been abandoned within biology, but many of its characteristics have been attributed to
DNA, acting as its material replacement. The idea of genes as symbols is a very influential
metaphor. However, the presence of this metaphor does not help to think about genetic
regulatory circuits in terms of genetic regulatory circuits but rather imposes a traditional frame
of mind onto this kind of organization. As Savageau says: “The common metaphor of the
genome as a blueprint for construction of the organism masks the difficult task of relating
structure and function of the intact organism to its underlying genetic determinants.” (1998,
p.55).
The story that I have sketched in terms of ICPs is in opposition to a symbolical or
representational interpretation. Internal control parameters do not provide descriptions of what is
to take place, they act only as triggers for specific self-organizing processes in a specific context.
In turn, such ICPs are part of complex network of regulatory factors, involving initiation,
modulation and feedback loops at and between different levels of organization. The challenge is
to decipher the operation of such regulatory networks. Apart from the sheer complexity involved
6there is also the counterproductive interpretation of symbolical descriptions involved which
obscures the kind of interaction involved in relating a genome to a whole organism. It is
unhelpful to see the genome as just one more instance of a symbol system as we already know
them.
This is not to deny that there may be close links between genetic regulatory networks
and the processes at work behind the human mind and behavior. However, instead of using
psychological symbol users as a conceptual framework for interpreting genetic functioning, it is
better to work the other way round. By starting with a genetic regulatory framework in mind, it
becomes possible to outmaneuver the symbol-metaphor, not only in the biological case, but, as I
will argue in the next section, also within psychology.
Kelso’s intentional interpretation of the two-component view
How does the two-component view impact on psychology? A good way to introduce the topic is
by looking at Kelso’s way of dealing with the issue. Given his well-known workhorse task of
bimanual finger-movements, self-organization comes into play as the spontaneous transition
from antiphase movement to in-phase movement when the movement’s frequency is increased.
To be more concrete, the simplest version of the phenomenon is when you move your two index
fingers up and down in an antiphase fashion—that is one up, the other down. Speeding up the
movement will result in a switch to an in-phase movement—both fingers being up or down at
the same time—without any intention to produce this synchronization. The body does that for
you ‘on its own’.
How about the second, steering component in this context? Our fingers may have a
tendency to synchronize when we let them. However, we can also disturb such tendencies by
consciously trying to maintain the antiphase pattern, and getting better at it as time passes. We
can also decide not to move our fingers in the first place, in which case the synchronization does
not occur at all. There is definitely more going on in the case of finger movements than mere
physical self-organization, and it is here that Kelso’s already mentioned “specific parametric
influences” come into play (1995, p.138, see also Kelso, This volume). There are some
interesting differences between Kelso’s view and the one presented above for biology. I will first
sketch Kelso’s position and then come to a comparison. Most important is that Kelso brings in
the concept of intention at this point. He claims that intentions “do not lie outside self-organized
coordination dynamics. They are an intrinsic, inseparable part of them. Intending and doing are
but two aspects of a single behavioral act.” (p.145) Given the distinction between the symbolic
realm—of which information and intentions are a part—and the world of dynamics, Kelso
solves the problem how the two are to be related by a move that is the opposite of the one made
in the previous section. Instead of placing self-steering on the dynamical side of the divide, he
solves the dilemma by claiming that “self-organized coordination dynamics are, at their very
roots, informational.” (Ibid.) In this way he “turns the mind-matter, information-dynamics
interaction on its head. Instead of treating dynamics as ordinary physics and information as a
symbolic code acting in the way that a program relates to a computer, dynamics is cast in terms
that are semantically meaningful.” (Ibid.) Kelso claims empirical evidence for this step but is
very short in specifying what exactly makes self-organizing processes intrinsically
informational. If I read Kelso correctly here, he says that order parameters are intrinsically
meaningful to organisms, as the order parameters consist of, or provide the information that
specifies the coordinative relations among an organism’s parts or between it and the
environment. And what could be more meaningful to an organism? In this way, Kelso reconciles
intentions with self-organizing processes and casts the former in the role of the necessary
steering factor in biological and psychological self-organization. Intentions provide the “specific
7parametric influences” that enable us to force our fingers to move in ways that go against their
intrinsic dynamics.
As far as I can tell, Kelso’s interpretation of the steering factor in biological cases of self-
organization in terms of intentions is not a good one. However, this is not the severe criticism it
might have been because his account leaves ample room for a different interpretation that does
not invoke intentions, meaning or information from the start. This interpretation is the one in
terms of internal control parameters as described in the previous section. First, let us have a look
at the problems that surround Kelso’s intentional explanation of steered self-organized
processes.
The first problem is that it is unclear whether non-biological cases of self-organization,
such as convection rolls, are semantically meaningful or not. Both options make trouble for
Kelso’s intentional steering. The idea that all physical forms of self-organization have semantic
meaning is unattractive. It smacks of panpsychism in which large parts of the universe are
inherently mental, which is in direct contradiction with the received view that mind and meaning
only come about in very particular configurations of matter (such as embodied nervous
systems). On the other hand, when only biological forms of self-organization exhibit intrinsic
meaning, the question arises how this difference comes about in a non-question begging way?
Kelso says that order parameters are meaningful to organisms, but this would make the
semantics derivative on there being organisms in the first place, which cannot be given the
assumption that living organizations are dependent on these steered self-organizing processes.
The last point also brings to the fore the difficulty that steered self-organization is supposed to be
part and parcel of living organizations from the very (evolutionary) start. Any self-organizing
processes within even the most primitive bacteria already involve all kinds of steering,
supposedly done by factors that act as internal control parameters. Bringing in mind and
semantics at these early stages of biological self-organization sure seems like explanatory
overkill. And last but not least, notions like semantics, intentions and—in this particular
context—information are part of what is to be explained. These concepts cannot be simply
injected at this point without any independent specification. Considering these problems, the
conclusion is warranted that the steering factor of self-organizing processes is not to be cast in
terms of intentions.
In contrast to this conclusion, Jordan (This volume) defends a view in which
intentionality is assumed to be present in all living systems—interpreted as autocatalytic
processes—whether these are single cells or humans. Jordan acknowledges that it sounds bizarre
to claim that a single cell “intends” to be what it is (that is to autocatalyze its own existence) but
claims that this bizarreness merely reveals hidden assumptions concerning intentionality that
deserve to be criticized. Without going into the details of his account, an important motivation
for his view seems to be that it explains the occurrence as well as the specialness of
intentionality (and consciousness) in a natural and ultimately physical world. By casting
intentionality so wide, Jordan builds upon the generally acknowledged sharp transition between
nonliving and living systems and makes intentionality as special as life itself. However, given
the arguments stated above, such a view remains very problematical, while it also remains
unclear what this wide reading of intentionality will add to our understanding of basic biological
and psychological processes. The difference between the biology of single cells and the
psychology of humans is huge. We need a suitably differentiated vocabulary to make sense of
this wide range of phenomena. Finding a cutoff point that will allow us both to maintain that
intentionality is special indeed and to stick to the notion of intentionality as intrinsically
psychological ought not to be too difficult when we acquire a better understanding of this range
of phenomena.
To return to the main argument, where does the rejection of intentional steering leave
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problematic intentional interpretation of the steering factor leaves the more basic ideas intact and
turns them into a coherent conceptual framework. This conceptual framework has already been
outlined in the previous section. Instead of intentions there are internal control parameters—or
whatever one wants to call them—that influence or force ongoing bodily coordinations in
particular directions, partly overcoming the intrinsic tendencies of our bodily dynamics. Rather
than shifting the dynamics into the symbolical realm, it is the steering factor that is shifted into
the dynamical realm.
At this point it must again be stressed that ICPs are non-specific with respect to the self-
organized order that they happen to control, or at least influence. What makes certain factors
within a biological organization ICPs is the effect they happen to have on the pattern formation
in a particular self-organizing process. There is no intrinsically meaningful connection between
an ICP and the self-organized macroscopic order. Order does not flow from the ICP into the
macroscopy. An ICP is nothing more than an unspecific parameter that has the property that it
can act as a switch that turns on or off, or modify a particular self-organizing process. When
there is talk about specific parametric influences, it relates to the effect an ICP has on self-
organization. An ICP acts a switch and has in this sense a predictable and repeatable influence
on particular occurrences of self-organized pattern formation. And, of course, a particular ICP is
present in a living organization because it has this influence on the pattern-forming processes of
that living organization (assuming this is its proper function in Millikan’s sense (1989)).
However, the ICP does not symbolize or represent the order it brings about in any way, it only
triggers—one might say it catalyzes—pattern-forming propensities that are already present. It is
important to keep these two readings of ‘specific’ separate, because the difference between
approaches based on self-organization and more regular representational and computational
based approaches, hinges on the distinction (Keijzer, 2001). The possibility for confusion here is
a final reason for being very critical of Kelso’s intentional interpretation of ICP-like factors. The
concept of intention suggests a much more direct and intimate connection between the intention
and the intended movement than what is provided for by ICPs. Kelso also occasionally seems to
suggest that intentions have an intrinsic meaningful connection with order parameters:
“Intentions ... are written in terms of the very order parameters that characterize the coordination
activity of the nervous system.” (1995, p. 146). The meaning present in intentions is the same as
the order produced in the intended movements. This reading comes very close to the old
cognitive science interpretation of a computational program that specifies what the motor system
has to do in order to produce coordinated movement, the exact opposite of Kelso’s own ideas!
What goes wrong? I would say that Kelso tries to do two things at once here, both providing an
account of self-steered self-organization, as well as providing an account of intentionality that
fits into the first story. However, the second enterprise interferes easily with the first one, when
the first has not been very clearly, explicitly and independently established. When it comes to
applying the idea of self-steered self-organization to psychology it is very important to keep both
enterprises conceptually distinct.
Applying the two-components view to psychology
Kelso’s intentional account of self-steered self-organization made an easy connection with
psychological matters. By bringing in intentions as a steering factor, his plea for a psychology
that takes self-organization seriously moves in a fluent way beyond any retorts that all of this is
no more than a movement science. Intentional self-steering is undoubtedly a central
psychological topic.
The conclusion arrived at in the previous section was, however, that self-steering in self-
organization must be stripped of its intentional robes, leaving the self-steering component quite
9naked. What is left is a two-component view that applies to the most basic forms of biological
self-steered self-organization, such as those occurring in bacteria. The obvious and important
question here is: How does such a basic interpretation bear on psychology?
The first thing to consider is that the steering factors are very different in the two
domains. Intentions are definitely not the same as some internal control parameter influencing a
self-organizing process within a bacterium. The same goes for any process of self-organization
itself that might be involved. The structures arising in bacteria are not the same as intentional
movements. Kelso deals with these differences by stressing that self-steered self-organization is
a general, abstract dynamical pattern that is to a large extend independent from—or multiply
realizable by—different physical instantiations. This strategy has the great advantage that this
conceptual framework can be applied to many structurally different phenomena, including
psychological ones, in an intuitively plausible way. As argued above, however, this loose usage
of the framework does not help to explain how intentional steering is any different from
biological self-steering in general.
A more productive use of the self-steered self-organization framework would do the
following: (a) Help explain the difference between more simple and more complex forms of
biological and psychological self-steering. (b) Help explain how the steering factor itself seems
to become increasingly symbol-like when we go from the most basic ICPs to unquestioned cases
of intentional action. Whereas ordinary ICPs are easily seen as mere triggering factors, in the
case of intentions there is a strong subjective experience that any self-organized effect or action
is already symbolically present beforehand. How can ICPs be fitted into this intentional domain?
For the first problem the conceptual outlines of a solution have already been described.
Self-steered self-organization is said to be controlled by genetic regulatory networks or, when it
comes to psychology, their neural equivalent. In Kauffman’s interpretation such regulatory
networks are themselves to be interpreted in terms of self-organization. Consequently, a self-
steered self-organizing organization can in turn be envisioned as being ‘steered’ by an
overarching regulatory network. The original regulatory network then turns into a first-order
system, which itself is steered by a second order system. In this way, it becomes thinkable that
self-steered self-organization is an arbitrarily extendable organizational form that can, in
principle, be build up until it includes genuine intentional forcing. This layered interpretation is
reminiscent of Brooks’ well-known subsumption architecture in robotics (Brooks, 1999).
Brooks started out with a robot and a control structure that could only perform a very simple
task, say standing up for a six-legged robot. Once the robot could do this, an extra layer was
added to the existing control structure that enabled it to lift and move its legs in such a way that
the robot moved forward, and so on. Although these robots are not cases of self-organization,
they do give an impression how self-steering can be extended by adding regulatory feedback
loops on top of an existing self-steering organization.
The second desideratum is much more difficult to deal with and its treatment here is
much more hypothetical than the postulation of multiple layers of self-steering. How do higher-
order ICPs finally turn into symbol-like entities that seem to incorporate—to describe Pattee
would say—beforehand the very order they help bring about? A plausible place to look for
transitional cases that become increasingly symbol-like steering factors is provided by the work
of Milner and Goodale on visually guided action (Milner and Goodale, 1995; Goodale, 1998;
Goodale and Humphrey, 1998). Milner and Goodale differentiate between a ventral and a dorsal
stream in the brain’s visual processing for action. Roughly, the dorsal stream consists of
projections that run from the retina to the primary visual cortex and then end up in the posterior
parietal cortex. The ventral stream consists of projections that after the primary visual cortex go
on to the inferotemporal cortex. Earlier, Ungerleider and Mishkin had proposed that the ventral
stream mediates object vision, providing a what-system, while the dorsal stream mediated
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spatial vision, forming a where-system. In this view, both streams subserved different aspects of
perception; the ventral stream identified an object, while the dorsal stream specified the object’s
location. Milner and Goodale (1995) on the other hand proposed that the dorsal stream was not
strictly perceptual but a “complex network of visuomotor modules interconnected with other
cortical and subcortical structures concerned with sensorimotor control”, which is “in the
business of transforming visual inputs into skilled motor acts.” (Goodale, 1998, p.R489) Many
neurons in the dorsal stream, for example, are activated both by visual stimulation and by
concurrent behavior. The ventral stream on the other hand is seen as fundamentally perceptual,
necessary for us to have phenomenal experience of the visual world, and only in a more indirect
way connected to action by influencing the dorsal stream. The general upshot of this account
would be that the ventral stream is a slower, relatively off-line system where longer-term
decisions are made such as ‘pick up that particular object,’ while the faster dorsal stream under
immediate visual control takes care that the hand moves to the proper place, that the hand is
oriented suitably with respect to the object, that the finger-thumb separation is appropriate to
grasp the object, and so on. So, Milner and Goodale’s proposal differentiates between a direct,
fast visuomotor system and a slower system for visual perception that acts by directing this fast
visuomotor system.
How can this model be brought to bear on the problem at hand: coming up with symbol-
like or even intention-like forms of ICPs? The first hurdle to take is linking up Milner and
Goodale’s account of the dorsal stream with an approach based on self-organization. Milner and
Goodale themselves do not dabble (as far as I am aware) in theories of self-organization, but
conceptually an interpretation in terms of self-organization seems at least a possible one. The
dorsal stream in their work is specifically interpreted as a perception-action system, a loop-like
structure that binds perception and action together. The dorsal stream does not come up with an
internal, action independent reflection of the external environment. All this brings Milner and
Goodale’s view on the dorsal stream close to accounts of behavior in terms of organism-
environment couplings and perception-action loops. Such accounts are exactly the ones in which
self-organization features very prominently (Clark, 1997; Keijzer, 2001).
The second hurdle consists of the interpretation of the ventral stream. Does this stream
contain symbol-like activity? Yes, the ventral stream performs a coding of object identities that
are abstracted from any direct dorsal perception-action occurrences. The ventral stream does not
deal with viewer-centered codings as does the dorsal stream, because “the perceptual
constancies intrinsic to many operations within the ventral system would need to be protected
from intrusions that could disrupt the continuity of object identities across changing viewpoints
and illumination conditions.” (Milner and Goodale, 1995, p.201) This is very symbol-like, and
the only thing that could plausibly be held against this claim is that the codings in the ventral
stream are not merely symbol-like but genuine symbols, entities that represent external reality
independent of any action component. In this case the ventral stream could be seen as the
beginning of an account of behavior in terms of specific instructions, just the kind of account
that one based on self-organization is set up to avoid. I will not try to argue against this
interpretation here. I will only argue that a symbol-like interpretation—that is one in terms of
ICPs—is possible as well.
Clark (1999) provides a first link between Milner and Goodale’s view on the ventral
stream and an interpretation in terms of perception-action couplings. Clark argues that the
perception-action loops of the dorsal stream can also be witnessed in the ventral stream. The
difference is that the two streams involve different kinds of action. The dorsal stream is geared
to action that involves movements that must deal with egocentric space and real locations. The
encodings of the ventral stream “are geared to action in the sense in which actions reflect the
specific needs, purposes and intentions of the agent.” (p.11) In this sense the ventral stream is
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also an action system, just like the dorsal one, only on a more abstract action-level. Clark
provides here a nice general congeniality between perception-action accounts (where self-
organization finds a psychological home) and the perceptual function of the dorsal stream. This
suggests that the ventral stream does not provide strictly perceptual encodings but encodings that
are dedicated to specific aspects of action generation. The important question then becomes how
the ventral stream influences the dorsal stream. If the two streams are so different, how do they
interact? Milner and Goodale (1995) recognize this as an essential question but their answer
remains very general: The ventral stream ‘flags’ an object so that the dorsal stream can deal with
it. Goodale and Humphrey (1998) use the metaphor of a human operator and a semi-
autonomous robot for clarifying this ‘flagging’ (p.202). They state that the “operator uses a
symbolic code to communicate with a robot that actually performs the required motor act on the
marked goal object.” (Ibid.) In this interpretation the ventral stream becomes very much like a
homunculus using general—that is not action-related—symbolic encodings that manipulates the
dorsal stream and other, lower levels of neural organization. This interpretation spells trouble for
any invocation of high-level ICPs here. However, the interpretation is itself unattractive for the
homuncularization of the ventral stream. Given the neuroscientific background of the ventral-
dorsal interaction problem, an account in terms of possible neuro-computational mechanisms
involved in the interaction between the two streams is much more plausible (Van der Velde and
De Kamps, 2001). When the ventral-dorsal interaction is cast in terms that incorporate the
neuro-computational mechanisms, involving the interactions between different cortical areas,
modulation of neural activity, gating circuits and so on, little is left of the ventral stream as a
domain of general symbolic encodings. In a very general sense, thinking in terms of ICPs comes
easily here. ICPs are no more than triggering factors that are tied to a particular regulatory setup,
and such factors seem to come naturally under the circumstances that are present in the ventral
stream.
To conclude, the ventral stream is a place where ICPs could play a role, given that the
dorsal processing and other neural centers are thought of as a many-layered setup of self-steered
self-organizing processes, which the ventral stream modulates at yet again a new level of
perception-action coupling. The question how such intentional ICPs become so much like
regular symbols is easily answered now. By adding layer upon layer of self-steering the
perception-action loops that become possible are increasingly involved in long-term goal
achievement and dissociated from the physical here and now in which an agent is situated. Any
ICP that would act within a regulatory network at such a level of perception-action coupling
must be dissociated from specific motor actions. For any high-level goal, there are many
possible motor actions that will lead to achieving the goal and this would bring in too many
executive details that interfere with the coordination of the long-term goal. This is the same
point that Milner and Goodale used in the first place for arguing that ventral processing must be
isolated from dorsal processing. ICPs that are thus isolated from specific physical perception-
action couplings are easily seen as fully independent from any perception-action coupling and
thus as perfectly general symbolic codes. This interpretation becomes even more natural because
there is a strong tendency to conceptually collapse all the many layers of a self-steering
organization into a singular operational system that is effectively a black box. The close
connections between intentional ICPs and the behavioral organization of which they are a part
are easily forgotten then. The situation is similar to the old and pervasive image of genes as the
fundamental factor for our phenotypic traits, while the context on which genetic functioning
depends remains out of focus. The case is similar for intentional ICPs, which are easily mistaken
for context independent symbols.
All this positive talk about the possibility and even the plausibility of the self-steering
self-organizing conceptual framework in a psychological context should not be mistaken for
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genuine evidence for this framework. I hope this has been clear all the time. Self-steered self-
organization is an idea that needs to be cashed out with empirical findings and theory in order to
make it more than a mere, although nice, idea. The discussion of ICPs in the context of the
ventral and dorsal visuomotor stream is not more than an appetizer for what might be: an
extensive empirical and conceptual psychological framework, based on self-steering, that
reaches all the way up to a clearly cognitive and human context. This appetizer is no
replacement for a main course and that dish still has to be prepared and cooked. The key issue is
how to proceed from here on? How can self-steered self-organization be made a testable and
more concretely elaborated theory about the generation of the human mind and behavior?
One important message, I think, is that self-organization in biological and psychological
systems must become more closely tied with the structural—biochemical, morphological and
neural—characteristics of those systems. A loose, butterfly approach that touches upon all kinds
of different cases of self-organization and shows these to be instantiations of a general, multiply
realizable phenomenon is good to establish that self-organization is genuine. However, that
message should be digested by now. The problem at hand is to uncover how biological and
psychological systems make specific use of the general principle of self-organization. This
requires explicit attention for the details of biological structures, such as nervous systems.
An obvious way to go from here is to turn to cognitive neuroscience. The technological
developments of the last few decades have made it possible to investigate monkey and human
brains in unprecedented ways. However, even though I think that cognitive neuroscience is
extremely important, for the purposes of uncovering the neural and behavioral organization
behind self-steering, it seems not the best and should certainly not be the sole approach. The
human brain and human action is just too complex for this purpose. The work of Milner and
Goodale exemplifies how much comes to depend on positive interpretations when self-steered
self-organization is to be developed in this highly complex context.
At stake here is not developing an account of the particular workings of the human brain
and its role in human action. The problem is to uncover general principles of self-steering and
self-organization that are supposed to be also at work in the human condition. What is missing in
psychology is an understanding of the cyclic or loop-like organization present in perception-
action couplings and in nervous systems themselves (Bell, 1999). Apart from a formal
mathematical approach of such problems, the best place to study this kind of organization
empirically is by turning to the simplest psychological systems. To define a psychological
domain in this context, some cutoff point with biology in general will be necessary. The
presence of mind cannot fulfil this role here. A mind is a very complex organization, and any
really simple psychological organization would be a doubtful example of the presence of mind.
A more plausible demarcation for psychology is provided by the presence of (animal) behavior
that involves the activity of a nervous system (see also Keijzer, 2001). This demarcation (a)
separates the kinds of system that ought to be addressed by psychology from biology in general,
(b) includes the human condition but (c) also much more simple psychological systems, that is
any organism in possession of a nervous system. The latter cases should help to unravel the
basic cyclic operation of nervous systems and the problem how increasingly complex
perception-action couplings are generated by increasingly complex neural organizations.
Orlovsky, Deliagina and Grillner (1999) provide an example of this turn toward more simple
behavioral systems. The three authors of this book all studied locomotion in cats until the
beginning of the 1980s. Subsequently they all turned to much simpler organisms (lampreys and
mollusks) because of “an increasing feeling of dissatisfaction caused by the fact that a number of
principal questions concerning the locomotor system could not be answered in the cat model. …
This difficulty was caused by the extreme complexity of the networks.” (p.262) To conclude, the
study of basic behavioral capacities in simple (when compared to humans) animals seems a
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good place to study the basic principles involved in psychological instances of self-steered self-
organization.
Conclusion
Self-steered self-organization in psychology is still a hazy concept. What seems clear however is
that it ought not to be interpreted in terms that particularly apply to an intentional, human-level
psychological context. Self-steering does not involve intentional forcing or ordinary
representations dissociated from their context of use. Compared to intentionality, self-steering is
a more basic and general concept that applies also to lower levels of organization. Making sense
of self-steering in psychology requires a fundamental understanding of perception-action
couplings and the neural modulation of such couplings. Whether this understanding comes from
studying humans or other animals is irrelevant, and as some invertebrate species provide much
more accessible model systems for uncovering such principles, the implication is that the basic
behavior of insect-like creatures becomes an important topic for a self-steering self-organized
approach in psychology.
Having said this, it should also be stressed that this is not a plea to neglect genuinely
human psychological phenomena. The picture sketched here is one of many layers of self-
steered self-organization ranging from basic forms of biological organization to the classic
cognitive capacity of playing chess. This is a very wide range of phenomena and it ought to be
clear that over this range qualitatively new forms of biological and psychological organization
have arisen (Maynard Smith & Szatmáry, 1999). For example, the difference between
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells is huge, and so is the difference between the psychological
characteristics of lampreys, cats and humans. Lampreys may provide good model systems to
study some basic principles. Still, the ways in which such basic principles are expanded on in
cats and humans provide important psychological topics on their own account. In contrast to
Jordan (This volume), it seems plausible that, somewhere along this range, but not from the
start, classic mental concepts like intentionality and representation become appropriate. But even
here one should be wary whether these concepts are helpful to cast light on human psychological
functioning, or whether it is the other way round and these concepts will themselves be filled in
and clarified by a better understanding of the many layers of human psychological functioning.
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